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Abstract   This paper focuses on the importance of accountable governance ar-
rangements to successfully manage high seas fisheries. It proposes replacing the
current right of open access to high seas fisheries with defined property rights
issued to nation states and managed within a governance framework designed to
optimise environmental and economic outcomes from the use of high seas fisher-
ies. We propose that the high seas freedom to fish be transformed to a right to
share in the net wealth generated from sustainable harvest of high seas fisher-
ies. Management of high seas fisheries should ensure that: (i) all nations have a
right to benefit from high seas fisheries, (ii) all harvesting is environmentally
sustainable, (iii) fisheries resources are used efficiently, and (iv) management
agencies are accountable. Rather than relying on the cooperation of nations
through regional fisheries management organisations (RFMOs), we suggest the
establishment of accountable management organisations of which nations are
beneficial owners. The paper presents a proposal we hope will prompt discus-
sion and further research on alternative governance arrangements to achieve
sustainable management of high seas fisheries.
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Introduction
The last half of the 20th century saw a rapid, worldwide expansion in fishing, a
growing acknowledgement that marine fisheries need to be managed, and a corre-
sponding proliferation of international agreements to try to address the problem of
orderly—and sustainable—development of fisheries.
International agreements sought to give coastal states and flag states defined
rights and responsibilities in relation to fisheries management, yet there continues to
be evidence of serious problems (see Garcia and de Leiva 2001 for an overview).
Since the mid-1970s, the proportion of overexploited and depleted fish stocks has
increased from 10% to approximately 25% (FAO 2004). Marine ecosystems are be-
ing simplified and made less resilient to disturbance as a result of fishing down the
G.T. (Stan) Crothers is Deputy Chief Executive of the Ministry of Fisheries, P.O. Box 1020, Wellington,
New Zealand, email: crothers@fish.govt.nz. Lindie Nelson is a Senior Policy Analyst at the Ministry of
Fisheries, Private Bag 14, Nelson, New Zealand, email: nelsonl@fish.govt.nz.
The views expressed in this paper are the authors and do no reflect the views of the Ministry of Fish-
eries or the New Zealand government. We are grateful for comments received from two anonymous re-
viewers, as well as suggestions and encouragement from Jon Sutinen, Carolyn Risk, Alex Edgar,
Jonathan Peacey, Mark Edwards, Amanda-Jane Healy, Nick Wyatt, and Jim Sinner.Crothers and Nelson 342
food chain (Pauly et al. 2002). In addition, overcapitalisation has resulted in ineffi-
cient harvesting and dissipation of global wealth. The current use of fisheries
resources is, in general, neither biologically nor economically sustainable.
At one level—on the water—overcapitalisation causes overfishing: the harvest-
ing capacity of the global fishing fleet exceeds the productive capacity of global
fisheries. But, as Munro (2000) observes, overcapitalisation itself is not sufficient to
explain the crisis—there is also a failure by fisheries managers to address
overcapitalisation and its effects.
This paper asserts that current governance arrangements for high seas are cen-
tral to the management failure. We propose to address the management failure
through the establishment of accountable management organisations for high seas
fisheries. The paper describes the governance arrangements and functions of these
organisations, and suggests an approach to implementation.
Links between Overfishing and Governance Arrangements
Current Legal Framework
The current legal framework is centred on UNCLOS—the 1982 United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea. UNCLOS defined specific rights for coastal
states to harvest and manage fisheries within Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs),
and confirmed that all states have freedom to fish in the high seas, albeit with an
attendant duty to take measures to conserve high seas fisheries and an obligation to
co-operate in the management of high seas fisheries.
Limits on the ability of the UNCLOS regime to enforce obligations attached to
the high seas right of open access were revealed by the high-profile depletion of
high seas fish stocks in the Bering Strait Donut Hole (Alaskan pollock) and the
Newfoundland Grand Banks (cod). Such management failures prompted a call at the
1992 Rio Summit (UNCED 1992) for a UN conference on the management of
highly migratory and straddling stocks. This, in turn, led to the 1995 United Nations
Fish Stocks Agreement (UNFSA 1995).
UNFSA enhanced the UNCLOS legal framework by better defining the rights
and responsibilities of coastal and distant water fishing nations, in particular the
duty to cooperate either directly or through joining or establishing an RFMO. Under
UNFSA, coastal states and states fishing on the high seas are required to give effect
to their duty to cooperate by becoming members of relevant RFMOs. Other states
with a ‘real interest’ in the fishery may become members.
Problems with Existing Governance Arrangements
Despite the UNFSA enhancements, RFMOs still face difficulties in achieving sus-
tainable fishing. Member states are often unwilling to make the tough decisions
necessary to restore overexploited fisheries, and enforcement is given a low priority
(Alder and Lugten 2002). Differing interests of member states lead to compromise
on the management goals, so that even where there is cooperation, effective man-
agement measures are not adopted (FAO 2002). RFMO decisions on allocation of
access rights provide little incentive for non-parties to join the RFMO or cooperate
with the management measures (Rayfuse 2006).
Effective governance arrangements are critical to achieving sustainable environ-
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features of the current governance arrangements contribute to the failure to manage
overfishing in the high seas.
(1) Rights and responsibilities under UNFSA are not defined in a manner that
secures adequate investment in fisheries management by RFMOs or member states.
The need to accommodate newcomers1 and the inability to bind in non-parties (free
riders) creates disincentives for RFMO members to adopt tough management mea-
sures to rebuild or conserve stocks, since they cannot secure the benefits of the
management measures. As a consequence, insufficient resources are devoted to set-
ting, monitoring, and enforcing rules to ensure that fishing is sustainable.
(2) There is no accountability for fisheries management outcomes. UNFSA does
not specifically provide for RFMOs to be held accountable for their fisheries manage-
ment performance, so there is no corresponding incentive for the RFMOs to create
governance frameworks that ensure member states are held accountable. States can
sign up to regional agreements, but are not held accountable for controlling their
vessels or their nationals in a manner that meets the state’s responsibilities.
(3) There are no benefits of responsible fishing. UNCLOS does not specifically
address the responsibility of nations as consumers of fish products, and thus cannot
effectively contribute to ensuring that fish trade is limited to product sourced from
sustainably managed fisheries.
(4) RFMOs set their own management goals. In the absence of an accepted defi-
nition of sustainability, RFMO management goals and measures are driven by the
short-term interests of member states.
In our view, the current legal and institutional framework does not adequately
reward nations that choose to cooperate and behave responsibly and does not pro-
vide specific means to hold states accountable for their high seas duties and
responsibilities. This is evident by the fact that more than a decade after negotiation
of UNFSA, it has been ratified by less than one third of the signatories of UNCLOS,
and significant areas of the high seas are still not covered by any regional agree-
ment, however effective such agreements may be.
In summary, overfishing in the high seas is a result of a lack of incentives for
states or RFMOs to act responsibly in dealing with the effects of an overcapitalised
fishing sector. Free riding and non-cooperation appear to be better choices for both
fishers and states, and there is little reward for investing in fisheries management.
Challenge
The Preamble of UNCLOS states that the development of the law of the sea “will
promote the economic and social advancement of all peoples of the world”
(UNCLOS 1982). High seas fisheries should be treated as global resources to be
managed for the benefit of all peoples of the world. Despite this, rights are currently
defined in a way that allow states to derive unilateral benefit from fishing and do not
provide the means for accountability to be imposed on states for any fishing that
does not accord with their responsibilities.
While international law imposes a responsibility to cooperate in the manage-
ment of high seas fisheries, economic models demonstrate that a cooperative
solution is only possible when the cooperative outcome is better for all parties than
1 Article 11 of UNFSA lists matters to be taken into account when determining the nature and extent of
participatory rights for new members, but Article 8(3) states that the terms of participation must not pre-
clude their membership. The effect of these requirements is that RFMO members must accommodate the
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the non-cooperative outcome, and when the agreement is binding in a manner that
deters non-compliance (Munro 2000; Bjorndal et al. 2000). Further, achieving a suc-
cessful outcome often depends on having broad scope for bargaining, including
opportunities for transfers between parties (Munro, Van Houtte, and Willmann 2004;
Jones, Pearse, and Scott 1980).
We see the challenge as one of defining rights that generate a governance frame-
work aligning the interests of nations with sustainable management of high seas
fisheries. This means revoking the right of open access and replacing it with a right
to benefit from the wealth generated through sustainable management of high seas
fisheries. If nations stand to gain from sustainable fisheries management, it is in
their interest to support the new governance arrangement.
Theoretical Underpinning of a Revised Governance Framework
In our view, management of high seas fisheries should ensure that: (i) all nations
have a right to benefit from high seas fisheries, regardless of whether they partici-
pate in fishing, (ii) all harvesting is environmentally sustainable, (iii) fisheries
resources are used efficiently, and (iv) management agencies are accountable.
For all nations to benefit, the net wealth created from sustainable fishing should
be distributed to nations. To maximise the net wealth generated from high seas fish-
eries, a management regime with the characteristics of a ‘sole owner’ should be
adopted (Scott 1955). That is, we should create an entity capable of co-ordinating—
and minimising the transaction costs of—the processes of information collection,
harvest right allocation, and enforcement for an entire stock or series of stocks
(Hanna 1998). Consequently, institutional arrangements must ensure that the exclu-
sive management rights for a stock, or a complex of related stocks, are vested in a
single entity.
To distribute the benefits of the wealth created, an organisational structure is
needed that unambiguously specifies the beneficial interest of individual nations.
Organisational structures that could distribute the wealth generated include trusts,
cooperatives, and corporate models.
The ability to secure investment is critical to the choice of organisational struc-
ture. Townsend (1995) notes the benefits of corporate governance over cooperative
governance, particularly in terms of making long-term investment decisions. Fisher-
ies management requires investment, especially to rebuild stocks, where benefits
accrue over the longer term. Corporate shareholders have certainty in relation to the
allocation of costs and benefits of such investment, whereas under a cooperative
structure, the distribution of benefits is not directly related to the distribution of
costs, creating reluctance to invest except in circumstances where everyone invests
and benefits equally.
Governance rules for trusts and cooperatives could be established in a manner
that unambiguously specifies nations’ obligations and beneficial interests; however,
these would, in essence, be based on a corporate ownership model. A corporate
organisational structure, consistent with the OECD principles for corporate gover-
nance, can accommodate dispersed ownership and provide the necessary security of
beneficial interest to elicit long-term investment (OECD 2004).
To ensure that fisheries are managed sustainably over the long term, perfor-
mance standards to achieve sustainability should be set independently of the
management organisation. This means that the short-term interests of current partici-
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Proposal
Sovereign rights in relation to high seas fisheries need to be redefined to generate
accountable governance frameworks. We propose two new entities to achieve ac-
countable governance: companies to manage high seas fisheries and an independent
environmental standard setter.
High Seas Fisheries Management Companies
We propose that high seas fisheries be managed by high seas fisheries management
companies (HSFMCs), to be owned by nations. Adopting this proposal would re-
quire initiatives and agreement among nations at the United Nations level. It
requires a fundamental change in the legal framework currently applied to high seas
fisheries; namely, the high seas freedom to fish would be extinguished. In its place,
nations would have a right to be beneficial owners of HSFMCs.
The HSFMC would have a corporate ownership structure. Shares would be held
by nations on behalf of their citizens. We envisage that, initially, one HSFMC would
be established for each ocean. All nations that accede to the enabling international
agreement would be allocated a share in each of the HSFMCs established. HSFMC
shares should be transferable, allowing nations to rationalise their shareholding ac-
cording to their particular interests.
Each HSFMC would have explicit and exclusive authority to manage the high
seas fisheries within its portfolio—including allocating and enforcing the access
rights. The aim of the HSFMC would be to maximise shareholder wealth by manag-
ing high seas fisheries in the relevant ocean, subject to meeting externally set
environmental standards. Fisheries management costs would be met from the
HSFMC’s revenue, which is derived mainly from selling access rights. The differ-
ence between the HSFMC’s revenue and management costs would be the return to
shareholders.
To maintain the potential for further wealth creation, HSFMCs should be al-
lowed to merge, divide, or specialise over time, provided the latent right for nations
to be allocated shares whenever they accede to the agreement is protected. HSFMCs
could issue shares to raise equity; however, shares issued to investors rather than
governments would not be voting shares. Issuing voting shares to any entity other
than governments would dilute the accountability requirements.
A core feature of the proposal is that states could not exercise their right to ben-
efit unless a governance arrangement was in place that was capable of ensuring that
fisheries management resulted in the generation of wealth on a sustainable basis.
This would remove the current ability of states to act for unilateral benefit and to
avoid meaningful accountability for the exercise of their rights.
Environmental Standard Setter
We propose that environmental performance standards be set by an independent
body (‘environmental standard setter’) with powers to sanction or require remedial
action when HSFMCs fail to meet the standards. The standard setter must operate
under the highest possible level of international legitimacy and so should be estab-
lished either under the auspices of the United Nations or of UNCLOS.
We envisage that a process similar to that of the Codex Alimentarius Commis-
sion could be used to set and revise science-based standards. Environmental
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sustainable fishing. The standards would relate to harvested stocks and the direct
and indirect impacts of fishing on the marine environment. We suggest the standards
be developed to meet Articles 5 and 6 of UNFSA. Where a standard relates to fisher-
ies managed by more than one HSFMC—for instance tuna fisheries or albatross
bycatch—the standard setter may require HSFMCs to take a coordinated and consis-
tent approach to meeting the standard.
Remedial actions required could range from additional monitoring to a verifi-
able plan to meet the standards in a particular timeframe. Sanctions imposed could
take the form of ‘soft sanctions,’ such as public disclosure of HSFMC non-perfor-
mance, or financial sanctions on the HSFMC. In the former case, citizens could
lobby their government to ensure that the HSFMC meets its performance require-
ments. The effectiveness of soft sanctions will depend on the degree of government
responsiveness to its citizens’ concerns. Financial sanctions may be more effective
for ongoing non-performance. By decreasing the returns to shareholders, financial
sanctions would align the interests of HSFMC shareholders with good environmen-
tal performance.
Given the requirement that HSFMCs meet environmental standards and the
standard setter’s powers to ensure compliance, nations and HSFMCs should have a
right to seek judicial review of any decisions on standards, sanctions imposed, or re-
medial actions required. Such judicial reviews could be considered by the
International Tribunal on the Law of the Sea.
Governance Arrangements
The proposed governance framework is based on the specification—and separa-
tion—of the roles and responsibilities of shareholders, directors, managers,
harvesters, the environmental standard setter, and auditors. Proposed accountability
mechanisms seek to ensure that all players can be held accountable for their respon-
sibilities. The ability of HSFMCs to earn and maintain the confidence of
governments, NGOs, and the environmental standard setter is critical to its success
and longevity.
Roles and Responsibilities
Shareholders are the owners of the HSFMC—that is nations. Shareholders would
appoint HSFMC directors, receive dividends, and report to their citizens. Directors
are responsible for setting the strategic direction of the HSFMC, monitoring its per-
formance, and appointing the chief executive. Directors would be appointed based
on competency, and would be required to disclose any direct or indirect interests
that related to the activities of the HSFMC. Managers are responsible for managing
the HSFMC to maximise shareholder wealth, consistent with the strategic direction
and within environmental standards.
Harvesters are those with rights granted by the HSFMC to participate in fisher-
ies it manages. Harvesters would have to comply with the conditions set for their
access.
The environmental standard setter sets performance standards to achieve sus-
tainable fishing, and when an environmental audit indicates HSFMC
non-performance, it requires remedial action or imposes sanctions.
Auditors are external bodies appointed by the HSFMC directors to provide inde-
pendent reports on the HSFMC’s performance. Financial auditors would audit
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mental auditors would audit HSFMCs and prepare an environmental audit report on
their performance in relation to meeting environmental standards.
Accountability Mechanisms
Accountability—that is, being held responsible for one’s duties—is fundamental to
this proposal. Clear accountability is important to maintain credibility, make perfor-
mance transparent, and avoid conflicts of interest.
HSFMC Directors to Shareholders
As a corporate entity, HSFMC directors would face the standard corporate account-
ability requirements to shareholders, including holding an annual meeting open to
all shareholders and presenting an annual report and audited financial statements.
The annual report would also include the environmental audit report. If shareholders
were dissatisfied with performance, they would have rights to make resolutions and
vote on new directors.
Shareholders will have recourse to company and criminal law in the country
where the HSFMC is incorporated to manage issues such as protection of minority
shareholder interests or corruption by directors or managers.
HSFMC to Environmental Standard Setter
The environmental audit report would be distributed to the environmental standard
setter (as well as HSFMC shareholders). If the HSFMC was failing to meet environ-
mental standards, the environmental standard setter would be able to require
remedial action or impose sanctions.
HSFMC Shareholders to Citizens
Since governments hold HSFMC shares on behalf of their citizens, disclosure by
shareholders is an important element of ‘public accountability.’ HSFMC sharehold-
ers would have to report the company’s results, including the financial and
environmental audit reports, back to their citizens. The HSFMC annual report would
be made available to the public. If citizens and NGOs are dissatisfied with HSFMC
performance, they can advocate for their government, as an HSFMC shareholder, to
take action to improve the HSFMC’s performance. We also propose that states
should disclose to their citizens (say, once a year) the receipt of HSFMC dividends
and the sale or purchase of any HSFMC shares. If citizens and NGOs are dissatis-
fied with their government’s actions, they can take political action.
Environmental Standard Setter to the International Community
The environmental standard setter should report annually to the international com-
munity, for instance to the United Nations General Assembly, on its decisions on
standards, the overall performance of HSFMCs in relation to meeting environmental
standards, and any sanctions imposed or remedial actions required.Crothers and Nelson 348
Functions of HSFMCs
HSFMCs would create wealth for their shareholders by managing the access rights
to high seas fisheries. Each HSFMC would set conditions for access, allocate access
rights, and enforce the access regime in the relevant ocean. Consequently, HSFMCs
would have three main functions: regulatory, allocative, and enforcement.
Underpinning these three functions would be fisheries management services,
such as stock assessment research, education and liaison, database management, and
registry services—which HSFMCs would either provide or purchase. HSFMCs
could also provide services to harvesters, such as operating a trading house for con-
tracts, on a fee-for-service basis, or provide fisheries management services on
contract to other fisheries agencies. These ancillary services would be limited to ac-
tivities that do not conflict with managing access to high seas fisheries, and would
be driven by their scope to increase shareholder value.
Regulatory Functions
The regulatory functions of HSFMCs relate to determining the operational rules for
fishing, so that the environmental standards are met. The operational rules will de-
termine the terms and conditions of the access rights.
Operational rules could include catch limits, gear and area restrictions, and re-
quirements for record keeping, reporting, and vessel monitoring. Determining the
operational rules would require scientific input on stock abundance, the environ-
mental impacts of fishing, and the effectiveness of alternative management
measures.
Allocative Functions
The allocative functions of HSFMCs relate to granting access (harvesting) rights.
We suggest that the access right be specified as a contract between the HSFMC and
harvester. The right would be granted to fishing companies rather than nations.2 De-
pending on the type of fishery and the operational rules set to achieve the
environmental standards, the access right contract could be defined in terms of catch
limits or area limits.
We do not envisage that HSFMCs would grant permanent access rights. Instead,
HSFMCs would grant variable term (for instance, 1 to 15 years) access rights to par-
ticular high seas fisheries. Granting some long-term access rights would allow for
efficient rationalisation of fishing capacity over time. The mix of short-, medium-, and
long-term access rights offered would depend on the characteristics of the fishery.
We propose that HSFMCs would allocate most, if not all, of the access rights by
auction. Auctions are a means to maximise the revenue gained from sale of access
rights and increase the openness and transparency of the allocation decisions. Allo-
cating access by auction can avoid the key problem of providing for newcomers in
RFMOs, since newcomers are able to bid (Butterworth and Penney 2004). In addi-
tion, harvesters—faced with limited access rights for which they must pay—have
incentives to maximise the value of their access right (Trondsen 2004).
2 Certain nations might be harvesters (as well as HSFMC shareholders), by operating state-owned fish-
ing vessels, but their harvesting responsibilities would be specified, and enforced, in the same way as
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Enforcement Functions
Enforcement functions relate to non-compliance with the access right and illegal
fishing.
Non-compliance
Since access rights are to be granted in the form of a contract, any non-compliance
should be enforced using commercial law. Contracts would specify necessary mea-
sures to monitor compliance, such as record keeping, reporting and product-tracking
requirements, allowed landing ports, and obligations to carry observers or allow in-
spectors on board. If necessary, the terms of the access-rights auction could limit
participation to bidders of ‘good standing.’
In the event of non-compliance, the HSFMC could seek damages in civil courts
or revoke the contracts. The penalties—both damages and revocation—should aim
to establish effective deterrence. To ensure that contracts can be enforced, they
should be registered only in countries that satisfy minimum jurisprudence standards.
Illegal Fishing
Illegal fishing—in this case, fishing without a contract—is a more fraught area of
enforcement. Upton and Vitalis (2003) review the measures taken to curb illegal
fishing in the high seas, noting the difficulties in imposing treaty-based enforceable
obligations on flag states, and the promise of using port states’ authority and catch
documentation schemes to prevent landing and marketing of illegal take.
HSFMCs would need to rely on the cooperation of port states to take action
against boats landing illegally taken fish—as provided for in Article 23 of UNFSA.
And they would need to rely on the cooperation of coastal states to manage prob-
lems that might arise where fishing vessels operate both in the high seas (under a
HSFMC contract) and in EEZs (under the coastal states’ access regimes). Achieving
such cooperation would depend on the establishment of operational agreements be-
tween HSFMCs and coastal states—which might require HSFMCs to pay for coastal
state services. The greater the overlap between HSFMC shareholders and coastal
and port states, the easier it should be to secure effective agreements, since such
states would then have a financial interest in sustainable high seas fishing. Agree-
ments could lead to, and expand upon, cooperation between national enforcement
agencies, in turn facilitating networking of intelligence and delivery of enforcement
services such as inspection, surveillance, and investigation.
Building on the UNFSA features that allow boarding and inspection of vessels
on the high seas, we suggest that HSFMCs should have rights to board and inspect
fishing boats from acceding parties, seize catch and gear if no contract is held, and
divert a boat to port. Operational enforcement agreements could result in port states
making evidence obtained by an HSFMC in the high seas permissible for the pur-
pose of prosecuting under their national jurisdictions, or allow HSFMCs to contract
out enforcement duties to nation states.
HSFMCs could not enforce their management regime against vessels flying
flags of states that have not acceded to the enabling international agreement. How-
ever, HSFMCs and their shareholders would have an interest in disclosing any
fishing by non-parties. HSFMCs could also seek to have member states use WTO-
compatible trade measures to prohibit the importation of fish caught by non-parties.
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of nations—the power to refer states to the WTO directly rather than relying on re-
ferrals by member states.
It is likely that illegal fishing can only be deterred through international trade
measures, such as prohibiting sale of fish unless it can be demonstrated to have been
taken legally (that is, under an HSFMC contract or in accordance with specific EEZ
regimes). Product traceability processes and catch documentation schemes are al-
ready in use and should be encouraged and enhanced.
There will continue to be some non-compliance and illegal fishing. The key is-
sue is whether compliance rates are likely to be higher or lower under the proposed
arrangement than under the existing arrangements. Under this proposal, HSFMCs,
rather than flag states, would be responsible for enforcing the management regime
for high seas stocks. Consequently, capacity issues for nations to meet flag state re-
sponsibilities would be substantially reduced. We do envisage some residual
responsibility for nation states in relation to enforcement, but these responsibilities
would be negotiated between HSFMCs and states on a case-by-case basis, allowing
specific capacity issues to be dealt with directly.
An Approach to Implementation
As noted earlier, establishing HSFMCs would require an international agreement to
extinguish the UNCLOS high seas freedom to fish and replace it with sovereign
rights for states to be beneficial owners of HSFMCs. This could be achieved through
an enabling agreement that constitutes a new implementation agreement for
UNCLOS or results in substantive amendment to UNCLOS as it relates to high seas
fisheries.
The enabling agreement would set governance standards for HSFMCs, public
disclosure requirements for shareholders, minimum jurisprudence standards for
HSFMC incorporation and harvest contract registration, and establish the framework
for the external environmental standard setter and auditors. Initially one HSFMC
would be established for each ocean. All nations would be entitled to receive shares
in each HSFMC. Shares would be issued once the state acceded to the enabling in-
ternational agreement.
The enabling framework would allow specific arrangements for each HSFMC to
reflect the particular management challenges of its ocean. We suggest these manage-
ment challenges be resolved in a negotiating forum set up for each ocean.
Issues likely to arise include recognition of: the special dependency of certain
nations on fisheries resources (e.g. Pacific Island countries), the existing fishing ca-
pacity of certain nations, and the initial costs of restoring fisheries. Addressing these
issues could result in agreements for preferential access rights or special classes of
shares. Munro, Van Houtte, and Willmann (2004) note the importance of allowing
for such ‘side payments’ to broaden the scope for all nations to gain from the agree-
ment to cooperate.
A critical issue is to recognise the disparate interests of shareholders. Nations
with current high seas fishing interests are likely to face increased short-term costs,
such as having to purchase access rights or retire fishing capacity. Nations with no
current fishing interests will not face these costs, but could be called upon to fund
investment to restore depleted fisheries. Ocean-specific negotiations could give rise
to an agreement for shareholdings to partially reflect existing interests; for instance,
one portion of the shares could be allocated on the basis of ‘one-nation, one-share,’
and another portion could be allocated on the basis of other factors, such as catch
history or previous investment in conservation.
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the access rights for incumbent fleets. Alternatively, shareholders might determine
that certain bidder groups had preferential access through a first right of refusal.
It is also necessary to create incentives for countries—especially port and
coastal states—to join the agreement as early as possible. One option could be a
provision for early signatories (say within the first five years) to be eligible for a
class of share with early dividend payments.
Share transferability increases the incentives for nations to join the agreement
by giving them the ability to convert their ‘high seas fisheries right’ to cash for other
purposes. However, for oceans where many fisheries are depleted, it might be a long
time before the HSFMC could declare a dividend to shareholders—creating an in-
centive to join and immediately sell shares to avoid any liability. To counter this, we
suggest a moratorium on trading of HSFMC shares for a period of time—for in-
stance five years from the date when a nation acceded to the agreement. Further, a
member nation that sells all of its HSFMC shares must continue to act in a manner
consistent with the agreement. Having benefited from the agreement, all member na-
tions would have to remain bound to the commitment to allow the HSFMC to
manage the high seas fisheries.
There would be a transition period and process for HSFMCs to assume manage-
ment responsibilities for high seas fisheries. Discrete high seas fisheries that are
currently not managed by RFMOs could be managed by HSFMCs immediately. A
transition from the existing arrangements would enable HSFMCs to replace RFMOs
for highly migratory stocks. Straddling stocks would require a more complex transi-
tion, as HSFMCs would need to work with coastal states to agree on a management
regime.
Conclusion
Current governance arrangements for managing high seas fisheries are not capable
of delivering desirable environmental and economic outcomes. The high seas free-
dom to fish results in an open-access resource—fisheries are overexploited, resource
rent is dissipated, and there are no rewards for cooperation or responsible fishing.
This proposal offers the potential to achieve sustainable management of high
seas fisheries. It would provide ongoing benefit for all shareholders in the
HSFMC—with all states having a right to be a shareholder. In essence, this proposal
is a ‘Swiss Corporation’ as discussed by Jones, Pearse, and Scott (1980)—the gover-
nance structure separates the fisheries management decisions from the decisions
about the distribution of the benefits.
Transforming the current high seas freedom to fish into a right to share in the
net wealth generated from sustainable harvest of high seas fisheries would better re-
flect the intentions of UNCLOS, by enabling states to benefit from sustainable high
seas fishing regardless of their fishing capacity. It would remove the ability of states
to derive unilateral benefit from fishing for which they cannot be held accountable.
Vesting explicit authority to manage high seas fisheries in an agency would al-
low for wealth creation through limited access. Existing fleets would face some
short-term loss, as in any fishery that needs rationalisation of harvesting capacity,
but limiting access in order to rebuild stocks would secure the long-run future for
high seas fisheries. Effective management of high seas fisheries would not depend
on the capacity and willingness of flag states to meet their responsibilities. HSFMCs
would enforce the management regime.
Setting environmental standards externally would address the risk that share-
holders could seek to maximise current returns at the expense of future generations.
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means to enforce those environmental standards by imposing sanctions for non-per-
formance and creating the incentives for appropriate investment in fisheries
management services, such as research and enforcement.
Fundamentally, this proposal is about improving fisheries management out-
comes through effective accountability for fisheries management performance.
HSFMCs would be accountable to their shareholders and the wider international
community for their performance in meeting environmental standards and generat-
ing shareholder wealth. In the absence of this accountability, no one is responsible
for avoiding the environmental and economic loss associated with overfishing high
seas stocks.
The paper is put forward to prompt discussion on alternative governance ar-
rangements to manage high seas fisheries. We recognise that implementation of this
proposal raises formidable challenges to reform the international legal framework,
to negotiate the establishment issues, and to replace RFMOs. But given the pros-
pects for improved outcomes from this model, we believe it is worthwhile to pursue
further research on an appropriate international instrument and on aspects of this
proposal that could be applied to improve the performance and accountability of ex-
isting RFMOs. Such aspects include the use of auctions to grant access rights
(Trondsen, Matthiasson, and Young 2006), management of access rights using con-
tracts, and the possibility of establishing an external body to set environmental
standards and monitor performance. A United Nations resolution could lead to the
establishment of a standard-setting agency and a requirement that RFMOs report on
how their fisheries management is achieving standards.
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